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Robert Mueller must have known that he was having serious trouble with his public when New York Times columnist Gail Collins suggested he might be a wimp. When Mueller was appointed special counsel, Collins was satisfied that he was “a very serious choice” for the role; last week she mused that while “a lot of us thought he’d wind up as a chapter in the history books of the future,” he may qualify now for no more than “an asterisk.” Others commented more in sorrow than in anger. In a Times op-ed, Robert De Niro even stepped outside his “Saturday Night Live” portrayal of Mueller to implore him to speak out more forcefully. Overall, there was evidence of smashed hope, as in this headline: “Disappointed Fans of Mueller Rethink the Pedestal They Built for Him.”

Now Democrats, progressives and others horrified by Donald Trump have come to at least this agreement with the president: There are problems with the way Mueller did his job. Republicans were first, and quick, to sour on the special counsel. The president they chose to follow pounded away at the illegitimacy of the investigation, alleged partisan bias in its conduct, and concocted zany theories of personal conflicts of interest that disqualified Mueller from holding the position. For entirely different reasons, and expressed far less virulently, the other side of the aisle has begun to join the crowd of Mueller critics.

It has been a steep fall for Mueller, the straight-arrow law enforcement professional known and much admired for going “by the book.” His background, history of service and reputation had made his appointment especially compelling. In 2011, when Congress extended his FBI director term by two years, the Senate vote was unanimous. Congressional leaders made clear that it had not lightly made the exception to the 10-year limit for the position; but Mueller—then described in news reports as “widely respected by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle”—was deemed a good reason to do it.

Then, when Mueller was appointed as special counsel, USA Today advised its readers that “a Congress utterly fractured by partisan bickering came to rare bipartisan agreement … as members of both parties effusively praised the selection of former FBI director Robert Mueller.” Jason Chaffetz, a reliable Republican congressional warrior, pronounced it a “great selection,” one that should be “widely accepted.” Even Freedom Caucus Chair Mark Meadows, noting that Mueller credibility might be greater with Democrats than Republicans, offered that “he has credibility on both sides.”

In these polarized times, many imagined that, drawing on his well-earned reputation, Mueller could take on this extraordinary assignment in a deeply divided political environment and pull it off. He would, because he was Bob Mueller, get the benefit of the doubt on the hard calls.

But playing by the book did not at all times appear adequate to the task. To be the straight arrow was both a blessing and a curse, the reason for the disappointment as well as the original, warm welcome. In the Russia investigation, Mueller was under pressure to enforce not just the law but also norms of appropriate presidential conduct; to stand up for the rules but, if necessary, break new legal ground; to vindicate regular order when the president and key associates at the center of his inquiry hold regular order in contempt.

Many of those who cheered his arrival and supported him in his mission had little use for a “by the book” conservative approach, believing that he was operating under emergency conditions. This was a case, after all, about a president charged with colluding with a foreign power to win an election; a president who felt free to throw up one obstacle after another to accountability. Commentators calling for aggressive prosecution counseled Mueller to find ways around the limitations imposed by the special counsel rules. He was urged to steer around the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion prohibiting the indictment of a sitting president. He was exhorted to find ways to inform congressional impeachment deliberations, via a “road map” or otherwise, when, under the special counsel rules, he lacked the authorization formerly given to independent counsels to identify potentially impeachable offenses and was limited to communicating on confidential terms with the attorney general.

In many respects, Mueller held his familiar ground, going by the book. Unlike Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, he stayed out of the press, eschewing leaks and tit-for-tat exchanges through spokespersons with the ceaselessly bellicose Trump and his lawyers. He was conservative in much of his reading of the law—such as, at least in my view, the punches he pulled in the campaign finance analysis of the Trump campaign’s engagement with the Russian government. He not only accepted that he was bound by the OLC opinions immunizing the president from prosecution, but he also read them, surprisingly (again, in my view, mistakenly), as preventing him from expressing even a conclusion about the legality of the president’s obstructive conduct. He took a sort of institutional high road, arguing that an unindictable president should not be confronted with a legal finding he could not challenge in a formal legal proceeding. He did not force the issue of the sit-down interview Trump rejected, apparently weighing its possibly limited value against the extended delay and uncertainties, and possibly even further disruption to government, entailed by protracted litigation.

Yet Mueller also improvised, apparently concluding that he had to depart in some respects from the most conservative editions of the “book.” The report he wrote was not a simple statement of the reasons his office pursued or declined prosecutions, which seems more like what the special counsel rules contemplated. He turned out an opus, packed with detail, which he surely understood—and, by his own account, hoped—would see the light of day, as it did. While he declined to make a “traditional prosecutorial judgment” about obstruction, he staked out aggressive, controversial ground on the theory of presidential liability for this offense and then indulged in un-Mueller-like commentary in explicitly refusing to “exonerate” Trump. He wrote a letter to the attorney general to protect his four-page summary of the report knowing that this, too, would become public, even though the rules commit all questions of publication or public commentary to the attorney general.

In the end, Mueller was hardly as free-wheeling as a Comey, but he was not the purest version of the straight arrow. One could imagine a range of choices far more self-limiting, more conservative in approach and theory, than the ones he made. He worked with the materials at hand and within challenging conditions: the OLC opinions, certain of the limitations of the special counsel rules, the outrageous behaviors of a president that tested the boundaries of established law and norms, the unprecedented nature of a number of the legal issues. To navigate this treacherous course, with all the intense expectations, Mueller eventually pushed the boundaries.

It would not be enough for some critics and far too much for others. If too much the straight arrow, he would risk being a chump, failing to rise to the demands of the moment. If not enough the straight arrow, he would put at risk the credibility, accumulated over the course of an exceptionally distinguished career, that prompted his well-received appointment.

Of course, the disposition, or suspended judgments, affecting Trump personally does not tell the whole tale of Mueller’s work. In two years, he secured indictments, convictions or pleas from 34 individuals and three companies. His prosecutions included Trump’s former campaign manager and his national security adviser but also members of Russian military intelligence and individuals with clear ties to the Kremlin. He sent an unambiguous message to Moscow. He did so in less than two years.

But there was little chance that Mueller would end his investigation to the bipartisan acclaim that greeted his appointment. This era is not one with much room for the hero who can overcome the pervasive partisanship; it is one in which the legitimacy of a process is judged primarily by its outcome. American political culture is not especially kind to the straight arrow right now. In principle, a special or independent counsel is an outstanding lawyer with a record of impartiality and fairness who has earned the public’s confidence and will keep it. In the politics of the day, a law enforcement professional like Mueller who might have been celebrated as having “near mythic” status will not enjoy it for long.

Did Mueller make mistakes? Democrats and Republicans are increasingly united in the belief that he did. First-rate scholars have argued a range of failures, including Richard Pildes’s contention that Mueller abdicated a “core responsibility” in declining to reach a judgment on obstruction of justice and Jack Goldsmith’s argument that the Mueller report misapplied the law governing a president’s exposure to liability for obstruction..

Perhaps it is inevitable that by one standard or another, given the choices he faced, Mueller would make mistakes or misjudgments, or leave himself exposed to the charge. The most that can be hoped of someone in Mueller’s position is that if he makes mistakes, it will be apparent that he erred in good faith, not for condemnable lack of judgment, independence or courage—and that had another been appointed instead, that special counsel would have done no better and, in all likelihood, far worse.

And now, at the end, we have the squall over his wish to have his report speak for him without further comment or congressional testimony. In this sense, he is one more time going by the book—the one he wrote, online and in bookstores around the country, still number one on the New York Times bestseller list.

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Trump Investigations from Michael_Novakhov (87 sites)


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The Trump Investigations Report – Review Of News And Opinions: 1. Trump from Michael_Novakhov (197 sites): Lawfare – Hard National Security Choices: Reflections on Robert Mueller

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Robert Mueller must have known that he was having serious trouble with his public when New York Times columnist Gail Collins suggested he might be a wimp. When Mueller was appointed special counsel, Collins was satisfied that he was “a very serious choice” for the role; last week she mused that while “a lot of us thought he’d wind up as a chapter in the history books of the future,” he may qualify now for no more than “an asterisk.” Others commented more in sorrow than in anger. In a Times op-ed, Robert De Niro even stepped outside his “Saturday Night Live” portrayal of Mueller to implore him to speak out more forcefully. Overall, there was evidence of smashed hope, as in this headline: “Disappointed Fans of Mueller Rethink the Pedestal They Built for Him.”

Now Democrats, progressives and others horrified by Donald Trump have come to at least this agreement with the president: There are problems with the way Mueller did his job. Republicans were first, and quick, to sour on the special counsel. The president they chose to follow pounded away at the illegitimacy of the investigation, alleged partisan bias in its conduct, and concocted zany theories of personal conflicts of interest that disqualified Mueller from holding the position. For entirely different reasons, and expressed far less virulently, the other side of the aisle has begun to join the crowd of Mueller critics.

It has been a steep fall for Mueller, the straight-arrow law enforcement professional known and much admired for going “by the book.” His background, history of service and reputation had made his appointment especially compelling. In 2011, when Congress extended his FBI director term by two years, the Senate vote was unanimous. Congressional leaders made clear that it had not lightly made the exception to the 10-year limit for the position; but Mueller—then described in news reports as “widely respected by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle”—was deemed a good reason to do it.

Then, when Mueller was appointed as special counsel, USA Today advised its readers that “a Congress utterly fractured by partisan bickering came to rare bipartisan agreement … as members of both parties effusively praised the selection of former FBI director Robert Mueller.” Jason Chaffetz, a reliable Republican congressional warrior, pronounced it a “great selection,” one that should be “widely accepted.” Even Freedom Caucus Chair Mark Meadows, noting that Mueller credibility might be greater with Democrats than Republicans, offered that “he has credibility on both sides.”

In these polarized times, many imagined that, drawing on his well-earned reputation, Mueller could take on this extraordinary assignment in a deeply divided political environment and pull it off. He would, because he was Bob Mueller, get the benefit of the doubt on the hard calls.

But playing by the book did not at all times appear adequate to the task. To be the straight arrow was both a blessing and a curse, the reason for the disappointment as well as the original, warm welcome. In the Russia investigation, Mueller was under pressure to enforce not just the law but also norms of appropriate presidential conduct; to stand up for the rules but, if necessary, break new legal ground; to vindicate regular order when the president and key associates at the center of his inquiry hold regular order in contempt.

Many of those who cheered his arrival and supported him in his mission had little use for a “by the book” conservative approach, believing that he was operating under emergency conditions. This was a case, after all, about a president charged with colluding with a foreign power to win an election; a president who felt free to throw up one obstacle after another to accountability. Commentators calling for aggressive prosecution counseled Mueller to find ways around the limitations imposed by the special counsel rules. He was urged to steer around the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion prohibiting the indictment of a sitting president. He was exhorted to find ways to inform congressional impeachment deliberations, via a “road map” or otherwise, when, under the special counsel rules, he lacked the authorization formerly given to independent counsels to identify potentially impeachable offenses and was limited to communicating on confidential terms with the attorney general.

In many respects, Mueller held his familiar ground, going by the book. Unlike Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, he stayed out of the press, eschewing leaks and tit-for-tat exchanges through spokespersons with the ceaselessly bellicose Trump and his lawyers. He was conservative in much of his reading of the law—such as, at least in my view, the punches he pulled in the campaign finance analysis of the Trump campaign’s engagement with the Russian government. He not only accepted that he was bound by the OLC opinions immunizing the president from prosecution, but he also read them, surprisingly (again, in my view, mistakenly), as preventing him from expressing even a conclusion about the legality of the president’s obstructive conduct. He took a sort of institutional high road, arguing that an unindictable president should not be confronted with a legal finding he could not challenge in a formal legal proceeding. He did not force the issue of the sit-down interview Trump rejected, apparently weighing its possibly limited value against the extended delay and uncertainties, and possibly even further disruption to government, entailed by protracted litigation.

Yet Mueller also improvised, apparently concluding that he had to depart in some respects from the most conservative editions of the “book.” The report he wrote was not a simple statement of the reasons his office pursued or declined prosecutions, which seems more like what the special counsel rules contemplated. He turned out an opus, packed with detail, which he surely understood—and, by his own account, hoped—would see the light of day, as it did. While he declined to make a “traditional prosecutorial judgment” about obstruction, he staked out aggressive, controversial ground on the theory of presidential liability for this offense and then indulged in un-Mueller-like commentary in explicitly refusing to “exonerate” Trump. He wrote a letter to the attorney general to protect his four-page summary of the report knowing that this, too, would become public, even though the rules commit all questions of publication or public commentary to the attorney general.

In the end, Mueller was hardly as free-wheeling as a Comey, but he was not the purest version of the straight arrow. One could imagine a range of choices far more self-limiting, more conservative in approach and theory, than the ones he made. He worked with the materials at hand and within challenging conditions: the OLC opinions, certain of the limitations of the special counsel rules, the outrageous behaviors of a president that tested the boundaries of established law and norms, the unprecedented nature of a number of the legal issues. To navigate this treacherous course, with all the intense expectations, Mueller eventually pushed the boundaries.

It would not be enough for some critics and far too much for others. If too much the straight arrow, he would risk being a chump, failing to rise to the demands of the moment. If not enough the straight arrow, he would put at risk the credibility, accumulated over the course of an exceptionally distinguished career, that prompted his well-received appointment.

Of course, the disposition, or suspended judgments, affecting Trump personally does not tell the whole tale of Mueller’s work. In two years, he secured indictments, convictions or pleas from 34 individuals and three companies. His prosecutions included Trump’s former campaign manager and his national security adviser but also members of Russian military intelligence and individuals with clear ties to the Kremlin. He sent an unambiguous message to Moscow. He did so in less than two years.

But there was little chance that Mueller would end his investigation to the bipartisan acclaim that greeted his appointment. This era is not one with much room for the hero who can overcome the pervasive partisanship; it is one in which the legitimacy of a process is judged primarily by its outcome. American political culture is not especially kind to the straight arrow right now. In principle, a special or independent counsel is an outstanding lawyer with a record of impartiality and fairness who has earned the public’s confidence and will keep it. In the politics of the day, a law enforcement professional like Mueller who might have been celebrated as having “near mythic” status will not enjoy it for long.

Did Mueller make mistakes? Democrats and Republicans are increasingly united in the belief that he did. First-rate scholars have argued a range of failures, including Richard Pildes’s contention that Mueller abdicated a “core responsibility” in declining to reach a judgment on obstruction of justice and Jack Goldsmith’s argument that the Mueller report misapplied the law governing a president’s exposure to liability for obstruction..

Perhaps it is inevitable that by one standard or another, given the choices he faced, Mueller would make mistakes or misjudgments, or leave himself exposed to the charge. The most that can be hoped of someone in Mueller’s position is that if he makes mistakes, it will be apparent that he erred in good faith, not for condemnable lack of judgment, independence or courage—and that had another been appointed instead, that special counsel would have done no better and, in all likelihood, far worse.

And now, at the end, we have the squall over his wish to have his report speak for him without further comment or congressional testimony. In this sense, he is one more time going by the book—the one he wrote, online and in bookstores around the country, still number one on the New York Times bestseller list.

Lawfare – Hard National Security Choices

1. Trump from Michael_Novakhov (197 sites)

The Trump Investigations Report – Review Of News And Opinions


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Trump Investigations from Michael_Novakhov (87 sites): 1. Trump from Michael_Novakhov (197 sites): Just Security: L’Affaire d’Assange: Why His Extradition May Be Blocked

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The Department of Justice’s release of a superseding indictment accusing Julian Assange of numerous Espionage Act violations has stirred grave concern among defenders of a free press. They are right to be worried. Although prosecutors have considered bringing criminal charges against those who publish national defense information on several occasions in the century since the Act’s passage, a grand jury has not been empaneled since WWII—and even it returned no indictments. Alarm over the future of the First Amendment in the age of mass leaks, however, has relatively obscured the threshold question of whether Assange is likely to stand trial at all. If he is not, it would change the calculation for how many people view these ongoing developments.

Why might Assange not stand trial in the United States for espionage? As I’ll discuss in detail shortly, the US-UK extradition treaty may strictly prohibit it. Espionage is generally considered a political offense, and the treaty forbids extraditing someone charged with political offenses. Those very clear legal propositions raise the questions of why the Justice Department added these charges, what fate really lies in store for Assange, and whether a U.S. federal court will get an opportunity to scrutinize the Assange indictment under the First Amendment.

While the new charges may signal an intention to put Assange away for many years, they could alternatively be read as a sign that the Justice Department recognizes the weaknesses in its case for extradition. If prosecutors believed Assange to be beyond their grasp upon issuing the espionage indictment, this would effectively demote it from a genuine charging document to a more symbolic statement—proof of the United States’ ability to investigate exfiltration of secret government data and of its preparedness to prosecute those who publish it. Whether this symbolic gesture intends to deter future WikiLeaks-like activities or to intimidate traditional journalists (or both) would then become a legitimate question, but still mostly a theoretical one. It would also mean, of course, that the Sessions-Barr Justice Departments have put down a marker—the precedent of indicting a publisher under the Espionage Act—without having to undergo First Amendment scrutiny by the courts.

On the other hand, if prosecutors still considered extradition likely, then one must ask why they have gone out of their way to complicate their mission by invoking espionage. In this version of events, either the Justice Department has foolishly made the case for Assange that he is being charged with a “political offense,” which is immune from extradition, or it has cunningly concluded that no such defense will stand regardless of the charges brought.

My purpose here is not to argue that a particular theory of the case is necessarily correct, but rather that one of them is likely true and that each provides a useful lens through which to understand and interpret unfolding events.

That Limited Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Charge

When shortly after Assange’s arrest on April 11, an indictment was unsealed accusing him with a single count of conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), many in the media breathed some sigh of relief. This charge seemed designed to narrowly target WikiLeaks without setting a precedent for prosecuting mainstream journalists in the future. Soliciting and publishing leaks are common pursuits in national security reporting. Participating in the hacking of government computers—Assange’s CFAA charge—is not.

Many legal experts also argued at the time that building the case for extradition would be fairly straightforward. As Just Security’s Steve Vladeck told CNN just hours after the arrest, “the more that the U.S. is able to sell the British government, sell British courts on the idea that [the CFAA charge] is the heart of the matter, I think the more of a slam dunk it will be for extradition.” Independent conspiracy charges are extraditable under the US-UK treaty, so long as the underlying crime is a serious offense in both countries. The critical question was whether the United States could articulate its extradition request without obliging the court to consider Assange’s political motives.

As Orin Kerr and others noted back in April, the CFAA charge was sufficiently modest to read very much as a “placeholder,” which the Justice Department could supplement in coming days. What they supplemented it with would be critical to Assange’s future.

The Mood in Britain

Extradition cases present a rich amalgam of law and politics, with the latter in a constant state of churn in Britain today. While Theresa May and Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt appear presently to support Washington’s request for extradition, as of the end of this week, May will be Prime Minister in name only. The struggle for power within the Conservative Party, a general election, or even a second Brexit referendum could radically alter the contending parties’ political incentives. Even Hunt, who is in contention to lead the party, hedged in his recent remarks about the Assange case. While he said he would not want to “stand in the way of the way of Julian Assange facing justice,” he also said, “we would have to follow our own legal processes just as the U.S. has to follow its own legal processes.” That’s the political-legal mix.

For its part, Labour is largely opposed to cooperating with the Trump administration’s request. The day after the arrest, party leader Jeremey Corbin spoke out against extradition, and 60 parliamentarians soon followed suit, writing the Home Secretary to argue that Sweden, not the United States, should get priory should it reopen the sexual assault investigation that sent Assange into hiding. Sweden initially announced that it will, though a Swedish judge has since denied the government’s request to detain Assange in absentia. The longer the Swedish battle plays out, the more likely it becomes that Assange waits out the Trump administration or the Tory majority.

A Way Out for Assange?: Conditions of confinement

Against that political backdrop, Assange’s attorneys will argue that extradition and continued confinement violate his human rights. Indeed, much of the discussion of Assange’s present detention revolves around his physical and mental health. His attorneys have long complained that the UK’s unwillingness to grant Assange safe passage to medical facilities has left him ill—a claim no doubt bolstered by the video broadcast around the world of the weak and haggard 47-year-old being dragged from the embassy. On the morning of Assange’s arrest, Agnes Callamard, the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions, tweeted that extradition to the United States would expose Assange to the risk of suffering serious human rights violations and described his time in the embassy as arbitrary detention, a conclusion shared by the UN HRC Working Group on Arbitrary Detention since 2015.

Late last month, Assange failed to appear via prison video link for an extradition hearing, citing poor health. And on May 31, Nils Melzer, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture who had examined Assange in detention, concluded that his prolonged isolation and vilification amounted “to progressively severe forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the cumulative effects of which can only be described as psychological torture.”

Assange’s attorneys are certain to argue, both in the British courts and, if necessary, all the way up to the European Court on Human Rights, that an American prison would amount to further torture or inhuman and degrading conditions for their client. Auspiciously for WikiLeaks founder, these arguments are of a very similar kind to those that defeated the extradition cases against Lauri Love and Gary McKinnon, Britons who were also wanted in the United States on hacking charges.

Political Offenses

Another defense available to Assange—and perhaps his most formidable one—will be to assert that he is being charged with a political offense. If that assertion is deemed correct, it could block his extradition, because, like many extradition agreements, the US-UK treaty forbids any transfer based on such charges. The categorical prohibition under Article 4 of the treaty could not be clearer: “Extradition shall not be granted if the offense for which extradition is requested is a political offense.”

But what is a political offense? Transgressions such as espionage, sedition, and treason are what are known as “pure” political offenses, including under UK law—that is to say, activities that directly target the state but that would not necessarily be criminal in other contexts. A related category, known as “relative” political offenses, covers common crimes that are incidental to purely political activities. Because various jurisdictions have interpreted the expansiveness of this political exception differently over time, a universal definition of a relative political offense is difficult to articulate, but the basic principle of the political exception in extradition has remained unchanged since its origins in the late nineteenth century. It states, in brief, that nations should not return political opponents to face prosecution for challenging the states that would sit in judgement of them.

Over time, many species of rebel lawbreakers have been deemed beyond the pale of the political exception, which has, variously, been interpreted to exclude anarchists, assassins of heads of state, war criminals, and, more recently, terrorists. Assange’s opposition to Washington policies, by contrast, does not fall easily into these buckets. His disdain for American actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay—the theaters of US military activity referenced in the indictment—is objectionable to those in power, but typical of many around the world. The scale of WikiLeaks’ operation was certainly unprecedented, but this scale tells us little about the nature of the ideological commitments that underpinned it.

This raises the question of whether the Justice Department could have resorted to the label of terrorism to classify Assange’s conspiracy charge as beyond the reach of the political exception. It is difficult to say. What we have seen already, however, is that the Department relied upon CFAA’s inclusion (specifically 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)) in the definition of federal crimes of terrorism (under 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)) to extend the statute of limitations, which would have otherwise run in 2015. And it’s worth recalling that in 2010, at the height of WikiLeaks furor, then Vice-President Joe Biden endorsed Senator Mitch McConnell’s characterization of Assange as a “high tech terrorist.”

Even so, a court assessing the CFAA charge alone may not have looked behind the conspiracy to consider whether it was incidental to the commission of a political offense. An indictment for espionage, however, would seem to demand that level of enquiry. And, indeed, that very enquiry may determine the outcome of the case.

Enter Espionage

Each of Assange’s possible defenses are strengthened by the 17 counts of espionage—the classic political offense—announced last month. Each one carries a maximum sentence of ten years, and even if federal sentencing yields a punishment that falls below the maximum, as it typically does, Assange could easily face life behind bars. The mere possibility of this augments his attorneys’ claim that he is fighting for freedom from long-term harsh conditions.

If the Justice Department believed or still believes that it will one day try Assange for espionage, then bringing the charges while he is in Britain was appropriate under the Rule of Specialty, which requires that all substantive allegations be brought before the prisoner is rendered. Had the Department sprung new charges on him after he was in its custody, a legal challenge led either by the British or by Assange, if he could assert standing, would have ensued. Regardless of its outcome, this development would have undermined American credibility in future extradition cases.

On the other hand, if prosecutors worried that the case for extradition was already weak, then the harm of further vindicating Assange’s defenses against extradition would be minimal in comparison to the effect of putting the fourth estate on notice through an aggressive indictment.

* * *

At least until the arrival of the Sessions Justice Department, Assange’s seven years of house arrest had essentially ossified the state of play—with the Americans neither confirming nor denying that they would bring charges, the British refusing to guarantee Assange’s safety from extradition to Sweden should he leave, and the Swedes refusing to promise they would not extradite him to the United States. Ironically, not even Sweden’s 2017 decision to drop its investigation could convince Assange to leave his bolt hole. This prolonged stasis was perhaps the reason, as much as the man’s disheveled appearance, that much of the world was shocked by the scenes of April 11. The question on everyone’s lips—“What happens now?”—needed an answer, and for many the logical assumption was that Assange would be sent to the United States. After all, if he weren’t going to be extradited, why had he imprisoned himself?

Extradition remains a distinct possibility, to be sure. But it is far from a certainty. The changing political environment in Britain, as much as the Justice Department’s own actions in accusing Assange of multiple acts of espionage, establish an environment vastly more dynamic than the seven-year standoff to which we had become accustomed. What’s next? Stay tuned.

Photo by Jack Taylor/Getty Images

The post L’Affaire d’Assange: Why His Extradition May Be Blocked appeared first on Just Security.

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June 07, 2019
“political criminology” – Google News: University subject profile: social policy and administration – The Guardian
Alerta de Google: fbi counterintelligence: FBI Counterintelligence Is Focus of Trump Campaign Spying Probe
“political criminology” – Google News: El Chapo: what the rise and fall of the kingpin reveals about the war on drugs – The Guardian
“fbi surveillance” – Google News: FBI Counterintelligence Is Focus of Trump Campaign Spying Probe – Washington Free Beacon
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“political criminology” – Google News: University subject profile: social policy and administration – The Guardian

FBI from Michael_Novakhov (28 sites)
What you’ll learn These degrees explore major social and political issues, such as inequality, unemployment and crime. In some programmes, there is a strong international dimension, exploring the influence of global forces on contemporary social problems, and comparing the responses that different countries adopt to issues such as poverty and inequality.
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Alerta de Google: fbi counterintelligence: FBI Counterintelligence Is Focus of Trump Campaign Spying Probe

FBI from Michael_Novakhov (28 sites)
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Just after midday on Tuesday 12 February, word came down that the verdict was ready in what had been widely described as the trial of the century. “United States of America v Joaquín Guzmán Loera” had lasted approximately three months – it took prosecutors that long to present what they described as “an avalanche” of evidence, which had taken more than a decade to compile.
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Getty Images BY: Bill Gertz Follow @BillGertz June 7, 2019 5:00 am The ongoing special Justice Department investigation into improper spying on the Trump campaign in 2016 highlights key failings by the FBI’s once-storied counterintelligence division.
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“fbi surveillance” – Google News: The FBI is sitting on more than 641m photos of people’s faces – Naked Security

FBI from Michael_Novakhov (28 sites)
Toss the FBI’s massive facial recognition (FR) databases into the wash, add recommendations about privacy laws that the government watchdog GAO (Government Accountability Office) laid out back in 2016, and set the dial to three years later.
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“counterintelligence” – Google News: Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims – The Atlantic

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Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims  The Atlantic

The attorney general has said the intelligence community was “spying” on the Trump campaign—language that risks a panoply of harms.

“counterintelligence” – Google News


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“counterintelligence Mueller Investigation” – Google News: Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims – The Atlantic

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Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims  The Atlantic

The attorney general has said the intelligence community was “spying” on the Trump campaign—language that risks a panoply of harms.

“counterintelligence Mueller Investigation” – Google News


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“military intelligence counterintelligence” – Google News: Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims – The Atlantic

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Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims  The Atlantic

The attorney general has said the intelligence community was “spying” on the Trump campaign—language that risks a panoply of harms.

“military intelligence counterintelligence” – Google News


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“counterintelligence cia” – Google News: Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims – The Atlantic

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Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims  The Atlantic

The attorney general has said the intelligence community was “spying” on the Trump campaign—language that risks a panoply of harms.

“counterintelligence cia” – Google News


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“FBI and Counterintelligence Reform” – Google News: Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims – The Atlantic

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Bill Barr’s Dangerous Claims  The Atlantic

The attorney general has said the intelligence community was “spying” on the Trump campaign—language that risks a panoply of harms.

“FBI and Counterintelligence Reform” – Google News


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Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠: RT @EricSClay: 17 years ago today, 17 #USNavy sailors aboard the #USSCole were killed and 39 wounded in a terrorist attack. Please remember…

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Michael_Novakhov
shared this story
from mikenov on Twitter.

17 years ago today, 17 #USNavy sailors aboard the #USSCole were killed and 39 wounded in a terrorist attack. Please remember them. pic.twitter.com/ZmUXp7PNpG



Posted by

EricSClay
on Thursday, October 12th, 2017 11:51am
Retweeted by

mikenov
on Thursday, June 6th, 2019 8:36pm

64 likes, 63 retweets

Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠


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Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠: RT @WesleyMcCraw: @spikepoint You mean Plinko, but I’m imagining Pinko and it is a very different game. #redscare pic.twitter.com/MZhGrFHCNI

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Michael_Novakhov
shared this story
from mikenov on Twitter.

@spikepoint You mean Plinko, but I’m imagining Pinko and it is a very different game. #redscare pic.twitter.com/MZhGrFHCNI



Posted by

WesleyMcCraw
on Friday, May 31st, 2019 5:20pm
Retweeted by

mikenov
on Thursday, June 6th, 2019 8:38pm

2 likes, 1 retweet

Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠


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Michael Novakhov on Twitter from Michael_Novakhov (4 sites): mikenov on Twitter: Donald Trump caught with his hand in the till palmerreport.com/analysis/hand-… via @PalmerReport

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Donald Trump caught with his hand in the till palmerreport.com/analysis/hand-… via @PalmerReport


Posted by

mikenov
on Friday, June 7th, 2019 9:45am

mikenov on Twitter

Michael Novakhov on Twitter from Michael_Novakhov (4 sites)


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Blogs from Michael_Novakhov (21 sites): Michael Novakhov on Twitter from Michael_Novakhov (4 sites): mikenov on Twitter: Donald Trump caught with his hand in the till palmerreport.com/analysis/hand-… via @PalmerReport

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Donald Trump caught with his hand in the till palmerreport.com/analysis/hand-… via @PalmerReport


Posted by

mikenov
on Friday, June 7th, 2019 9:45am

mikenov on Twitter

Michael Novakhov on Twitter from Michael_Novakhov (4 sites)

Blogs from Michael_Novakhov (21 sites)


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Russia News: “turkish coup 2016 and russia” – Google News: Politics this week – The Economist

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Politics this week  The Economist

Two days of ceremonies commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings of 1944. The queen and Theresa May, Britain’s prime minister, were …

“turkish coup 2016 and russia” – Google News

Russia News


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Russia News: Lenta.ru : Новости: Обладатель Кубка Стэнли задумался о пользе игроков НХЛ в сборной России

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Бывший вратарь сборной России Илья Брызгалов поделился мнением о выступлении российских хоккеистов на прошедшем чемпионате мира. «Смотришь на топ-игроков НХЛ — так там одни русские. Хотя как медали собирать золотые — где они все? Нету», — высказался 38-летний Брызгалов.

Lenta.ru : Новости

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Russia News: Lenta.ru : Новости: Кремль увидел шанс на встречу Путина и Трампа в Японии

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В Кремле допускают возможность встречи президентов России и США Владимира Путина и Дональда Трампа на саммите «Большой двадцатки» в японской Осаке, заявил пресс-секретарь российского лидера Дмитрий Песков. Он утвердительно ответил на вопрос о том, если ли шанс на встречу с учетом того, что конкретики пока нет.

Lenta.ru : Новости

Russia News


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Russia News: Газета.Ru – Новости дня: России предрекли новую перестройку

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Глава Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей (РСПП) Александр Шохин заявил, что перестройка может повториться в России, передает корреспондент “Газеты.Ru”.

“Мне кажется, что мы очень близки к повторению …

Газета.Ru – Новости дня

Russia News


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Russia News: Газета.Ru – Новости дня: Симоньян лежит под капельницей

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Главный редактор МИА “Россия сегодня” и телеканала RT Маргарита Симоньян рассказала о своем состоянии после инцидента с Любовью Соболь на “Эхо Москвы”, передает РИА “Новости”.

По ее словам, она находится в …

Газета.Ru – Новости дня

Russia News


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Blogs from Michael_Novakhov (21 sites): The FBI News Review: Kenyan Newspapers Review for June 7: Fear, anxiety among staff as Uhuru appoints top spy to lead KRA – Tuko.co.ke

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June 06, 2019
Kenyan Newspapers Review for June 7: Fear, anxiety among staff as Uhuru appoints top spy to lead KRA – Tuko.co.ke
Graft, drugs probe: FBI invites Haji, Kinoti to strategise on fighting graft | PRESS REVIEW : KTN News – The Standard
The Sad Sack And the Cardinal – Townhall

Kenyan Newspapers Review for June 7: Fear, anxiety among staff as Uhuru appoints top spy to lead KRA – Tuko.co.ke

Tuko.co.ke
The dailies for Friday, June 7, have focused on a range of issues including President Uhuru Kenyatta’s recent appointment of new Kenya Revenue Authority boss James Githii Mburu and reappointment of CBK Governor Patrick Njoroge.
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Graft, drugs probe: FBI invites Haji, Kinoti to strategise on fighting graft | PRESS REVIEW : KTN News – The Standard

The Standard
View More on Morning Express The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Noordin Haji leaves for the US this weekend as Kenya moves to enlist the Trump administration’s help to fight graft and money laundering.
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The Sad Sack And the Cardinal – Townhall

Townhall
Robert Mueller and James Comey have probably done more damage to the credibility and effectiveness of the federal law enforcement establishment than any two men in American law enforcement history.
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“political criminology” – Google News: Dr. NK Chakrabarti likely to be appointed new Vice Chancellor of NUJS – Bar & Bench

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Dr. NK Chakrabarti likely to be appointed new Vice Chancellor of NUJS  Bar & Bench

Prof (Dr) NK Chakrabarti is likely to be appointed the new Vice Chancellor of the National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), Kolkata.

“political criminology” – Google News


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“counterintelligence fbi” – Google News: Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation – Washington Examiner

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Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation  Washington Examiner

The Justice Department watchdog’s investigation into Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act abuse might not be winding down yet.

“counterintelligence fbi” – Google News


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“Get FBI out of Counterintelligence” – Google News: Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation – Washington Examiner

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Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation  Washington Examiner

The Justice Department watchdog’s investigation into Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act abuse might not be winding down yet.

“Get FBI out of Counterintelligence” – Google News


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“FBI and Counterintelligence” – Google News: Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation – Washington Examiner

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Former FBI lawyer James Baker cooperating with DOJ inspector general’s FISA abuse investigation  Washington Examiner

The Justice Department watchdog’s investigation into Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act abuse might not be winding down yet. Former top FBI lawyer James …

“FBI and Counterintelligence” – Google News


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